Why the Minneapolis ICE Shooting Was Justified: A Detailed Analysis [guest post by Tim Hsiao]

Tim Hsiao is an ethics professor, law enforcement officer, and firearms instructor. He is a Fellow at the University of Wyoming Firearms Research Center and has served with multiple municipal law enforcement agencies and as a contractor for a federal law enforcement agency.

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I am an ethics professor, law enforcement officer, and firearms instructor. Over the past week, I have seen a lot of extraordinarily bad takes on the recent Minneapolis ICE shooting.

Most of those misinterpretations fall into two basic errors: (1) misunderstanding the scope of law enforcement authority and (2) misunderstanding the legal conditions that justify the use of deadly force. In what follows, I will walk through the facts of the encounter and explain the legal framework necessary to assess it. Even on the most generous set of assumptions, the shooting was justified.

ICE Authority

One of the major talking points being circulated is that ICE agents have no authority over US citizens. This is false. ICE agents can be divided into two categories: criminal investigators (GS-1811) and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) officers. Both groups are sworn federal law enforcement officers with powers of arrest and authority to carry firearms.

Criminal investigators are assigned to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and are responsible for investigating violations of federal criminal law. They exercise general federal criminal arrest powers consistent with other 1811 agencies.

By contrast, ERO officers are assigned specifically to immigration enforcement, including arresting, detaining, transporting, and removing illegal immigrants. But while that is their primary mission, they nevertheless have the authority under 8 USC 1357 “to make arrests for any offense against the United States, if the offense is committed in the officer’s or employee’s presence.”

Investigative Detentions

But can ICE officers initiate traffic stops and other investigative detentions? Yes, they can. They can’t stop a car for speeding or running a stop sign, but under 18 USC 111 they can absolutely detain or arrest anyone who “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes” with the performance of their official duties. More on that later.

Under Terry v. Ohio (1968), law enforcement officers are allowed to detain someone who they reasonably suspect of engaging in criminal behavior in order to investigate further. The important thing to note here is that an investigative detention (also called a “Terry stop”) does not require probable cause. It only requires that an officer, based on training and experience, be able to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggest criminal activity may be afoot. This is a deliberately low threshold because the purpose of a Terry stop is not to make an arrest, but to confirm or dispel suspicion through brief investigation.

What this means is that an officer can stop and detain someone even if they haven’t actually been confirmed to have committed a crime. There only needs to be reasonable grounds, based on articulable facts, to suspect that a crime might have been committed. Suppose police stop and handcuff a person walking on the street who very closely matches the description of a suspect in a robbery that just occurred nearby. Even if further investigation reveals that he is just an innocent person who just coincidentally matched the description, the initial stop is not automatically unjustified because it was made on the basis of reasonable suspicion.

This should all seem rather intuitive, but many are unaware because most of what the public knows about police encounters is in the context of officers stopping vehicles for observed traffic infractions (e.g. an officer witnesses a car run a stop sign). These are traffic stops based on probable cause, where the officer knows that a crime has been committed. Most traffic stops take this shape, as they involve less headache to an officer. But strictly speaking, an officer does not need to actually witness a crime or even know that a crime occurred in order to stop a vehicle or detain someone on the street.

Now let’s return to the facts of this case. Renee Good’s vehicle was parked diagonally in the street in a manner consistent with blocking traffic. Video taken minutes before the shooting shows that her vehicle was parked in this way for at least several minutes, with Good honking her horn continuously. Footage does show her waving vehicles through, but that is consistent with her vehicle acting as an obstruction (that she would need to wave someone through presupposes that others would perceive her vehicle to be an impediment to movement).

Was she intending to obstruct ICE operations? Maybe. Maybe not. But even if we are generous and assume her intentions were not to impede ICE officers, her actions clearly provided reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention. Parking a heavy vehicle diagonally in the roadway, blocking traffic, and repeatedly honking for several minutes is not normal driving behavior and constitutes conduct that could reasonably be construed as impeding ICE agents in the performance of their duties. So even if ultimately there was no crime committed, it was certainly lawful for officers to initiate a traffic stop so they could investigate what was going on.

This is a crucial point that is overlooked by many commentators. Again, all that is needed for an investigative detention under Terry is reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been committed. The point of an investigative detention is to diligently confirm or dispel one’s suspicion. Thus, an officer does not need to establish that a crime has actually been committed before initiating a Terry stop.

To the law enforcement personnel on scene, Good’s actions were reasonably consistent with a potential violation of 18 USC 111. Intentionally positioning a vehicle to block movement, repeatedly honking, and inserting oneself into an active federal enforcement operation is conduct that can reasonably be interpreted as interference. That reasonable suspicion alone justified an investigative detention to determine whether a federal offense was unfolding, even if further investigation were to reveal evidence that she was not ultimately breaking the law.

So, even on the most generous set of assumptions, officers were well within their right to initiate a stop and demand that she exit her vehicle (see Pennsylvania v. Mimms). Once initiated, Renee Good was not free to leave.

Use of Deadly Force

Although she was legally detained and required to exit her vehicle, Good chose to flee the scene. Video footage shows that moments before accelerating, another officer reaches into the vehicle, apparently to grab Good. Shortly after, she accelerates forward, striking ICE agent Jonathan Ross with her vehicle.

Multiple video cameras captured the event. One video, taken from the front of the incident, shows the vehicle accelerating forward and Ross being pushed back, which is consistent with being struck. Another view, captured by Ross’s own cell phone camera, contains a clear “thud”, followed by the camera becoming destabilized. Based on the evidence it is hard to deny that Ross was in fact struck by the vehicle.

However, some do not think the evidence is conclusive. According to the New York Times, it is unclear whether the front angle video clip in which Ross appears to be pushed back is actually evidence of him being struck by a vehicle or just slipping on ice. That interpretation is possible in the abstract, but it does not account for the totality of the available evidence, including the vehicle’s forward movement, Ross’s sudden displacement, and the audible impact recorded on his camera.

Even so, the legal analysis does not turn on resolving this dispute. The more important point is that it does not matter whether the car actually struck Officer Ross.

The standard for use of force decisions is not whether an officer was actually struck or injured. Rather, it is whether the officer reasonably perceived an imminent threat of serious physical harm or death under the totality of the circumstances. An officer does not need to wait until he is shot, stabbed, or run over before using deadly force.

Under Graham v. Connor (1989), use of force must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not through hindsight. Thus, if officers confront an aggressive individual who points what appears to be a firearm at them, the presence of a perceived deadly threat justifies the use of deadly force. The later discovery that the object was a nonfunctional replica does not render the shooting unjustified. A reasonable officer facing an apparent firearm does not have the time or obligation to determine whether the weapon is real before responding.

In the same way, if an officer reasonably believes that a suspect is using a vehicle as a deadly weapon (i.e. that the vehicle’s movement toward an officer poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury), then the officer is justified in using deadly force even if later evidence suggests that the threat was misjudged or did not materialize exactly as perceived. A reasonable officer is not expected to wait for certainty or to conduct a detailed post-hoc analysis while exposing himself or others to deadly risk.

Was it reasonable for Jonathan Ross to believe that Renee Good’s movements constituted an imminent threat of serious physical harm or death? We know that (1) her movements and behavior were consistent with blocking traffic and impeding ICE operations, (2) another officer walked up to her vehicle and ordered her to exit, and (3) she refused to do so and actively resisted his efforts to remove her from the vehicle before (4) attempting to flee the scene in her vehicle. Video evidence from Officer Ross’s own cell phone camera indicates he was positioned in front of her vehicle and that she saw him positioned there immediately before driving forward. We can also hear Good’s “spouse” telling her to “drive, baby, drive.”

A reasonable officer in Ross’s position would have understood these facts as signaling escalation. A suspect who has refused lawful commands, resisted an officer, is urged by a passenger to flee, and then places a large vehicle into motion toward an officer positioned in front of it presents a textbook example of an imminent deadly threat. Good’s Honda Pilot was a 4,000 pound instrument capable of inflicting fatal injury in a fraction of a second.

Courts have consistently recognized that an officer need not gamble his life in the hope that a driver will brake, swerve, or change course at the last second. Once the vehicle is set in motion toward an officer, the threat has already matured. Nor does the analysis turn on whether Good subjectively intended to strike Ross. The governing standard is objective reasonableness to an officer on scene, not the suspect’s internal mental state. An officer is entitled to respond to what a suspect appears to be doing, not to speculate about what she might have meant to do in hindsight.

Some have argued that Ross wasn’t in danger because Good’s wheels were turned away from him at a particular moment. But under Graham, the question is whether a reasonable officer perceived an imminent threat based on the totality of the circumstances. Vehicles do not require perfectly aligned wheels to strike an officer, and steering angle can change. An officer facing a vehicle that has begun to move forward toward his position is not required to assume the driver will safely steer away, nor is he required to look down at the orientation of the wheels to see where exactly it is pointed.

It is likely that Officer Ross did not anticipate the vehicle would suddenly accelerate toward him and, as a result, was not focused on the precise orientation of the wheels. What mattered in that moment was not tire alignment but the sudden forward movement of a large vehicle in close proximity. A reasonable officer in that position would perceive a vehicle suddenly advancing toward him, not the fine details of its steering angle. Expecting an officer standing only a few feet in front of a stationary vehicle to first assess wheel orientation before responding to sudden acceleration imposes an unrealistic standard on split-second decision-making. That is exactly the kind of hindsight thinking that Graham forbids.

From Ross’s vantage point, Good’s conduct communicated an immediate willingness to flee using her vehicle despite the known presence of officers in close proximity. He was confronted with a rapidly evolving encounter in which a suspect had refused lawful commands, actively resisted removal, was urged by a passenger to flee, and then suddenly placed a large vehicle into motion while he was positioned in front of it. Ross’s perception of danger was reasonable, and his decision to use deadly force was justified.

Objections

In what follows, I will address several flawed arguments offered against the conclusion that the shooting was justified.

“The officer fired multiple shots after the vehicle no longer posed a danger to him.”

Some have conceded that the first shot may have been justified while arguing that the additional shots were not. This objection misunderstands both police training and the limits of human reaction time. Officers are trained to continue firing until a perceived threat is neutralized, which often results in multiple rounds being discharged in rapid succession. Human beings are not machines capable of instantly terminating action the moment conditions begin to change. There is an unavoidable delay between perceiving a change in threat, deciding to stop shooting, and physically executing that decision. As noted by the Force Science Institute:

“Everything an officer does takes time. It takes time to perceive that a threat level has changed and it takes time to decide to stop shooting and to mechanically activate that decision. When officers are engaged in continuous rapid fire, as their training requires for defending their lives, the stopping process is more complex and generally takes longer.”

Empirical research supports this point. One study found that “if an officer were to take 0.56 seconds to react to a stop-shooting signal, three to four rounds could be fired by the officer as part of an automatic sequence after the signal to stop had already occurred… because these numbers stand as more realistic measures for officers under high stress situations, the number of anticipated rounds fired following a stopping signal may stand at anywhere from zero to four. These results apply in real-world shooting situations if the officer is shooting, assessing, and attempting to simultaneously recognize a stop-shooting signal or indicator as the primary reason why they stop shooting.”

Viewed in this light, the additional shots fired by Officer Ross were part of a single, continuous defensive response and must be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances and the known limits of human reaction time. They do not, by themselves, support an inference of malice or unjustified force.

“The officer should not have stood in front of the vehicle nor should he have fired into a moving vehicle.”

Some have made the argument, citing the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Barnes v. Felix (2025), that Ross’s act of positioning himself towards the front of the vehicle resulted in an “officer-created jeopardy” that negated his claim to self-defense. But this is incorrect. First, Barnes did not actually address any questions about officer-created jeopardy.

Second, and more importantly, merely standing in front of a stationary vehicle does not amount to officer-created jeopardy. An officer does not create a deadly threat simply by positioning himself near a vehicle that is not moving and presents no immediate danger. Officer Ross could not have known, at the time he took his position, that Good would refuse lawful commands and suddenly accelerate forward.

From a tactical perspective, it is generally unwise to position yourself in front of a vehicle. Even so, this does not negate the right to defend yourself when that vehicle suddenly accelerates toward you. DHS policy does not categorically forbid the use of deadly force against the operator of a moving vehicle (and even if it did, policy is not law).

It is also worth noting that the video evidence does not suggest that Officer Ross intended to remain positioned in front of the vehicle. He had already circled the vehicle once and appeared to have been moving around it again when the vehicle accelerated. Even if this reflects poor tactics, it does not indicate that he deliberately placed himself in a position where the use of deadly force was inevitable.

“The officer could have just stepped out of the way.”

This objection is Monday morning quarterbacking at its finest. The Constitution does not require officers to select the least intrusive or least harmful alternative when confronted with a deadly threat. Under Graham, the question is not whether a different response might be imagined after the fact, but whether the force used was objectively reasonable when it was employed.

In Scott v. Harris (2007), the Court noted that officers are not required to gamble with their lives or the lives of others by delaying action in the face of a serious and immediate threat. Similarly, in Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014), the Court made clear that officers are not obligated to wait until a suspect successfully inflicts harm before using deadly force to stop dangerous conduct.

Applied here, the suggestion that Ross could have stepped aside is not realistic. Vehicle acceleration occurs in fractions of a second, and an officer standing in close proximity cannot reliably sidestep or outrun a moving vehicle once it is set in motion. The law does not fault officers for failing to test alternatives while exposed to a rapidly unfolding deadly threat.

Conclusion

Nothing in this case requires us to stretch the law or excuse bad behavior. ICE agents had lawful authority to detain Renee Good. She refused lawful commands, resisted officers, and then placed a vehicle into motion while an officer stood in front of it. In doing so, her vehicle became a deadly threat, regardless of whether contact ultimately occurred.

None of this means the outcome is morally satisfying. A woman died, and a family lost someone. An officer will carry the weight of that decision for the rest of his life. But under the governing legal standards, the shooting was justified.

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Tim Hsiao is an ethics professor, law enforcement officer, and firearms instructor. He is a Fellow at the University of Wyoming Firearms Research Center and has served with multiple municipal law enforcement agencies and as a contractor for a federal law enforcement agency.